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SIGNS OF THINGS TO COME: INTER-AGENCY
COORDINATION, SHARED EVIDENCE, AND
WIRETAPS IN PROSECUTING WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME

by
Natalie Bordeaux*

INTRODUCTION
Although wiretapping suspects and coordinated
investigations by law enforcement to prosecute wrongdoers are
tactics commonly used for so-called blue-collar crimes, the
economic collapse of 2008 spurred a new wave of ingenuity on
the part of the federal government in deterring and punishing
white-collar crime, particularly fraud. It wasn’t that any of the
investigative techniques used were novel, as all of the methods
had already existed. Rather, law enforcement’s approach was
fresh because its fact-gathering tools were rarely used for
white-collar crime before, and never employed as successfully
as in the parallel civil and criminal actions against Raj
Rajaratnam and others within his circle for insider trading.
Through inter-agency collaboration and wiretapping1, the
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities
and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) prosecuted and fined perpetrators of
__________________
*Natalie Bordeaux, Adjunct Professor, Pace University

2014 / Signs of Things to Come / 2

what had been described as the “largest hedge fund insider
trading case in history”.2
The “largest hedge fund insider trading case” was actually
two cases: United States v. Rajaratnam,3 and SEC v. Galleon
Management, LP.4 Both cases resulted from an organized
investigation by the DOJ and the SEC that uncovered a ring of
powerful, wealthy members of the financial industry engaged
in insider trading.5 Raj Rajaratnam, Manager of Galleon
Management LP (hereinafter, “Galleon”), a hedge-fund
advisory firm, was convicted of fourteen counts of conspiracy
to commit and actual commission of insider trading.6 In the
criminal action, Rajaratnam was sentenced to 11 years in
prison, ordered to forfeit $53.8 million, and was fined an
additional $10 million in criminal penalties.7 At the time,
Rajaratnam’s sentence was the longest ever imposed in an
insider trading case.8 In the civil action commenced by the
SEC, District Court Judge Jed Rakoff imposed a civil penalty
of $92,805,705 on Raj Rajaratnam.9
In both the criminal and civil cases, defense counsel raised
numerous challenges, including the government’s ability to
wiretap the defendants’ telephones, and utilize intercepted calls
as evidence of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the DOJ and SEC
prevailed in their actions against the defendants for conspiring
to engage in insider trading and committing insider trading.
Their success was founded largely upon the use of wiretapped
conversations between the defendants, and cooperation
between the SEC and the United States Attorney’s Office
(“USAO”)10.
This article will provide an overview of the Rajaratnam
cases, and explain key procedural and substantive issues it
presented, including the fundamental requirements for lawfully
obtaining wiretaps, the investigative and enforcement process
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for securities violations, and the increasing communication
between federal agencies regarding white-collar criminal
investigations. The article concludes that the efficiencies
afforded by wiretapping and the pooling of administrative
resources in fact-gathering will lead to an increase in
enforcement actions and penalties.
UNITED STATES V. RAJARATNAM11 AND SEC V.
GALLEON MANAGEMENT, LP12
On October 16, 2009, the USAO and the SEC filed
criminal and civil complaints, respectively, against Raj
Rajaratnam and other defendants13 for insider trading.14 The
USAO unsealed criminal complaints charging Raj Rajaratnam
and other defendants with conspiracy and insider trading under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193415, and
Rule 10b-516.
Both complaints involved the same conduct,17 and a
significant portion of evidence introduced in each case was
obtained from wiretapping the communications of several
defendants.18 Members of Rajaratnam’s ring included
personal friends Rajiv Goel and Anil Kumar, and a former
employee, Roomy Khan.19 At the outset, many of the facts
surrounding trades made by Rajaratnam on Galleon’s behalf
appeared remarkably fortuitous. However, upon closer
inspection, the trades served as strong evidence establishing the
commission of both civil and criminal violations involving the
unlawful use of material, non-public information.
Rajaratnam had enlisted the aid of Roomy Khan to obtain
“material, non-public information” regarding earnings,
acquisitions and business agreements of numerous publiclytraded corporations, including Google, Hilton Hotels
Corporation, Intel and Sprint Nextel Corporation.20 As
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Rajaratnam’s criminal conduct continued, law enforcement and
the SEC were able to identify a large quantity of information to
corroborate suspicions surrounding Galleon’s financial success.
For instance, Khan (who provided Rajaratnam with
confidential information regarding Polycom,21 the sale of
Kronos22 to a private equity firm,23 the acquisition of Hilton by
the Blackstone Group, and Google’s earnings reports), traded
on the information herself before the information became
public, and very close in time to Rajaratnam’s subsequent
activity on the stock, personally, and on Galleon’s behalf.24
Additionally, Rajaratnam purchased Hilton shares to capitalize
on the information that Khan had provided regarding an
upcoming acquisition of Hilton by the Blackstone Group25 on
behalf of the Galleon Tech Funds, an unusual investment for
funds whose objective is to invest in the technology sector.26
Yet there was still more information to establish
Rajaratnam’s illegal activities. After Rajiv Goel provided
Rajaratnam with insider information concerning Intel’s
earnings, and a business endeavor involving Sprint Nextel
Corporation and Clearwire Corporation,27 Rajaratnam
rewarded Goel by trading on Goel’s account, using insider
information concerning the imminent Hilton takeover, and
other companies’ information.28
Danielle Chiesi, portfolio manager at New Castle, used
several tips she received to trade on New Castle’s behalf, and
shared the information with other individuals, including
Rajaratnam.29 Chiesi traded on material nonpublic information
obtained from an Akamai Technologies, Inc. executive, and
shared this information with Mark Kurland, and Rajaratnam,
who traded on behalf of himself and Galleon using this
information.30
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Chiesi also received several tips from Robert Moffat, a
senior executive of IBM, which she used in trading on behalf
of New Castle. Moffat provided Chiesi with material
nonpublic information regarding the earnings of IBM and Sun
Microsystems, Inc., along with negotiations between AMD31
and two companies based in Abu Dhabi.32
Additionally, communications between several of the
defendants were ongoing, and/or extremely close in time with
changes in investments. For instance, Rajaratnam contacted
Goel on January 8, 2007, about one week before Intel’s
earnings information regarding the fourth quarter of 2006 was
to be released.33 On January 9, 2007, Rajaratnam began
buying Intel shares on his own behalf and that of Galleon.34
Over the course of the Martin Luther King Day weekend,
Rajaratnam and Goel were in repeated communication.35
When the markets reopened on Tuesday, January 16, 2007,
both defendants suddenly altered their investment strategies
regarding Intel, with Galleon selling its entire long position in
Intel.36 In its complaint, the SEC cites numerous examples of
continued communication coinciding with very pointed
changes in investing by defendants Rajaratnam, Galleon,
Chiesi, Kurland, New Castle, and Goel.37
AUTHORIZATION OF WIRETAPS PURSUANT TO
TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND
SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968
An Overview on the Use of Wiretaps
Today, the term “wiretapping” refers to electronic or
mechanical eavesdropping38, a sweeping description that
includes the surveillance of voice, e-mail, fax, and internet
communications.39 Other than certain enumerated exceptions
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described below, wiretapping is illegal and yields inadmissible
evidence.
In 1967, the Supreme Court issued two landmark decisions
regarding law enforcement’s use of wiretapped conversations.
Although several earlier cases had ruled upon the permissibility
of intercepted conversations,40 the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Berger v. New York41 and Katz v. United States42 confirmed
that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizures43 applied to intercepted communications in
places where an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.44
In Berger, the petitioner’s conviction for conspiring to
bribe the Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority
was based solely on recorded conversations using a planted
“bug” in the office of an attorney allegedly involved in the
bribery scheme.45 The Court held that law enforcement must
abide by the Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant
based upon probable cause before recording conversations in
an individual’s home or office.46
The holding in Katz went a step further than Berger,
extending Fourth Amendment protection to any location where
an individual may “justifiably” expect to have a private
conversation.47 In Katz, the petitioner’s conviction for
interstate gambling by wire communication was based, in part,
upon evidence submitted by the Government of the petitioner’s
portion of conversations recorded using a device attached to
the outside of the public telephone booth where the petitioner
had placed his bets. The Supreme Court confirmed that the
determination as to the admissibility of oral evidence required
the same analysis as conducted for physical evidence.48
Additionally, the Court dismissed the notion that physical
intrusion of a recording device was required for resulting
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recordings to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.49 After
Berger and Katz, law enforcement needed rules for permissible
electronic surveillance.
Added Guidance: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 196850
In response to these holdings, Congress undertook its own
efforts to define a clearer standard for law enforcement.
Congressional research found that unauthorized and
nonconsensual wiretapped communications were being used as
evidence in courts and administrative agencies by both
governmental and private parties, in violation of individuals’
privacy rights. 51
As a result of these findings, Congress enacted Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, also
known as the “Wiretap Act”.52 At its inception, the Wiretap
Act sought to balance the privacy interests of private persons
with the needs of law enforcement in intercepting
communications to prosecute individuals engaged in criminal
activity.53 This legislation made unauthorized or
nonconsensual interceptions of wire or oral communications
illegal.54 Additionally, it delineated specific requirements for
government officials to satisfy to obtain wiretap authorizations,
and regulated the use of such interceptions.
Statutory Requirements for Lawful Wiretapping
Permissible use of wiretaps by government agents is
comparable to any other governmental search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, as law enforcement must obtain
authorization to intercept communications in places where an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.55
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There are several ways in which law enforcement may
legally intercept wire, oral or electronic communications. For
instance, a “person acting under color of law” may utilize a
wiretap if a party to the communication or where prior consent
has been given by one of the parties engaged in the
communication.56
The Wiretap Act also permits application by both federal
and state law enforcement agencies to the appropriate judges
for authorization of a wiretap.57 Such application requires
great detail in order to avoid granting unfettered discretion to
law enforcement in its use of wiretaps. Supporting information
required for any wiretap authorization is similar to that of a
regular warrant application in that the application must be
made under oath,58 with a specific description of the facts and
circumstances upon which the applicant relies59 as showing
probable cause to believe that specific offenses have or are
being committed.60 The application must describe the type of
communication which authorities seek to intercept,61 and the
identity of the person, when known, whose communications
are to be wiretapped.62
However, the applicant must also provide a “a full and
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous”.63 As any wiretapping authorization is to be as
narrow in scope as possible, authorizations must describe the
type of communications to be intercepted,64 the location where
the authority to intercept is given,65 the agency possessing the
authority to conduct such interceptions,66 and the period of
time for which interception is permissible by the order.67
Additionally, the order must include a provision requiring the
interception to “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
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interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception” pursuant to the Wiretap Act.68
Despite the utmost precision with which wiretapping
authority is given, and a lengthy list of offenses for which
interception is authorized, the Wiretap Act enables law
enforcement to use information obtained from otherwise lawful
intercepts regarding offenses for which authorization was not
granted or those offenses that are not specifically listed in the
Wiretap Act as lawful grounds upon which wiretapping is
permissible.69 As will be discussed below, the United States
Attorneys’ Office procured a lawful intercept for an
investigation of wire fraud (an enumerated offense in the
Wiretap Act), and obtained admissible evidence establishing
charges of insider trading in the Rajaratnam case.
Furthermore, the Wiretap Act permits law enforcement to
share the information obtained from authorized interceptions
with other members of law enforcement.70 Cooperation is now
increasingly likely between several federal enforcement
agencies, including the United States Department of the
Treasury, the DOJ and the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development, as will be discussed below.
Issues Presented by the Rajaratnam Cases
Unlisted Offenses:
In the criminal action brought against Raj Rajaratnam and
others, Rajaratnam and Danielle Chiesi moved to suppress the
recorded conversations obtained by the DOJ pursuant to Title
III on several grounds. First, Rajaratnam and Chiesi sought
exclusion of the wiretapped calls from evidence because
insider trading was not an offense enumerated in Title III for
which a wiretap was permissible.71 In its application, the
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government requested wiretap authorization for investigation
of wire fraud, an enumerated offense for which recording
conversations is authorized.72 District Court Judge Richard
Holwell rejected this contention, noting that although Title III
only authorizes the use of wiretaps for offenses listed in 18
U.S.C. § 2516, it does not bar evidence obtained during the
course of a lawful wiretap for unlisted offenses, so long as
wiretap applications were obtained in good faith and “not as a
subterfuge for gathering evidence of other offenses.”73 Judge
Holwell found the DOJ’s applications to be very transparent,
detailing the insider trading plot, and setting forth the evidence
they had obtained that established probable cause to believe
that wire fraud and money laundering had been committed.74
Thus, the government’s investigation was conducted in good
faith, and evidence obtained by the wiretapped conversations
which established securities fraud was a “by-product” of
lawfully procuring evidence of wire fraud.75
Probable Cause:
Rajaratnam and Chiesi also argued that the government’s
applications and supporting affidavits failed to show probable
cause as to the necessity of the wiretaps.76 Rajaratnam argued
that the wiretap application and supporting documentation
falsely characterized co-defendant Roomy Khan as a credible
source, and misconstrued other evidence in the application.77
Judge Holwell rejected this challenge, noting that the
government’s application provided information that
corroborated Ms. Khan’s allegations that she had given
Rajaratnam insider information on Polycom, Hilton, Google
and Kronos.78 Specifically, Khan’s claims were validated by
Rajaratnam’s own statements to Khan in conversations she had
recorded at the request of the FBI.79
Full Statement of Other Attempted Investigative Procedures:
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Rajaratnam and Chiesi both sought suppression of the
recordings on the grounds that the wiretap applications did not
comply with Title III’s requirement of a “full and complete
statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”80 This
argument also failed, as Judge Holwell noted that the
requirement was not one of exhaustion of all other
investigative methods, but rather, communication with the
authorizing judge about the investigation’s progress and
difficulties corresponding with employing regular law
enforcement tactics.81 Where an application shows that less
invasive methods are unlikely to succeed or are impractical,
such facts will satisfy the requirements of Section 2518(1)(c).82
Minimization Requirement:
Both Rajaratnam and Chiesi also challenged the
introduction of several wiretaps, arguing that the government
failed to minimize conversations that were not relevant to the
investigation, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).83 Judge
Holwell noted that the wiretap authorizations properly included
the minimization order, and that the law enforcement agents
worked to reasonably minimize the interception of irrelevant
conversations.84 Furthermore, the Court recognized that an
investigation involving a large-scale conspiracy requiring
“more extensive surveillance may be justified in an attempt to
determine the precise scope of the enterprise.”85
Rajaratnam’s Motions for Acquittal:
Subsequent to these challenges, Rajaratnam sought
acquittal on all 14 charges against him at three different points
in the trial: (1) at the close of the prosecution’s case; (2) after
all evidence had been presented; and (3) after a jury verdict
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found him guilty of all 14 charges (five counts of conspiracy to
commit securities fraud, and nine counts of securities fraud).86
Amidst multiple arguments submitted regarding Rajaratnam’s
conviction, Rajaratnam’s attorneys contended that his
conviction on several conspiracy counts was based solely upon
indirect evidence from the wiretapped conversations and that
such conversations were inadmissible hearsay evidence.87
Both arguments were rejected. Pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, a co-conspirator’s statements made “during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” are not considered
hearsay.88 Furthermore, the government was able to provide
additional evidence corroborating statements made, notably,
changes in Rajaratnam’s investment positions within very short
time periods subsequent to calls made and information he
obtained therefrom.89
The SEC’s Discovery Demands for Wiretapped Conversations
from Rajaratnam and Chiesi:
In the course of the criminal proceedings commenced
against the defendants, the USAO had given Rajaratnam and
Chiesi the wiretap recordings that they intended to use at trial;
however, the prosecutors had not shared these recordings with
the SEC.90 Since certain recordings were in the possession of
Rajaratnam and Chiesi, the SEC sought to obtain production of
the recordings through discovery demands, which both
Rajaratnam and Chiesi opposed.91 Although there was no
dispute that such recordings would normally be discoverable,
Rajaratnam and Chiesi challenged the requests. They claimed
that they were unable to provide the SEC with the recordings
because Title III prohibited disclosure of interceptions not
explicitly permitted by statute, stemming from Congress’
privacy concerns in enacting Title III.92
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Judge Rakoff of the Southern District of New York noted
that 18 U.S.C. § 2517 had been amended in 1970 to enable
anyone who had lawfully obtained wiretap recordings to
disclose the contents of such recordings “while giving
testimony in any proceeding held under the authority of the
United States or of any State or political subdivision thereof.”93
In granting the SEC’s demand for production of the recordings,
Judge Rakoff observed:
[T]he notion that only one party to a litigation should
have access to some of the most important nonprivileged evidence bearing directly on the case runs
counter to basic principles of civil discovery in an
adversary system and therefore should not readily be
inferred, at least not when the party otherwise left in
ignorance is a government agency charged with civilly
enforcing the very same provisions that are the subject
of the parallel criminal cases arising from the same
transactions.94
Privacy concerns were addressed by the court’s issuance of
a protective order barring disclosure of the recordings to any
non-party to the case until a court of competent jurisdiction
ruled on a suppression motion regarding such disclosure.95
INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION OF
INVESTIGATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IN
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME CASES
The SEC is authorized to investigate potential securities
violations using administrative, civil, and/or criminal
remedies.96 The SEC may employ civil and/or administrative
actions to enforce the relevant federal laws.97 However, only
the DOJ may pursue a criminal action for these violations.98
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The investigation surrounding Rajaratnam and his codefendants showed that the ultimate success in prosecuting
Rajaratnam and others resulted from the complimentary
investigative approaches of the SEC and DOJ. The SEC had
employed conventional investigational tools to expose
Rajaratnam’s insider trading circle and was unable to unearth
the scheme to its fullest extent because the suspects had carried
out their violations by telephone.99 It was through the DOJ’s
efforts that wiretaps were authorized,100 and resulting recorded
conversations served as key evidence against the defendants.101
The Authority of the SEC
The Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 prohibit a
number of securities-related activities.102 Congress has given
the SEC the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
pertaining to such activities.103
After monitoring suspicious market activity, receiving a
complaint, or a referral from other SEC divisions or other
sources, the SEC’s Enforcement Division may commence an
informal investigation of possible securities violations.104
Upon completion of the initial review and identifying
violations, the Enforcement Division prepares a “formal
investigative order”, which requires only a non-adherence to
securities laws.105 The Enforcement Division is able to issue
subpoenas, and order production of documents.106 At the
conclusion of the Enforcement Division’s investigative
presentation, the Commission may authorize the Enforcement
Division to file a claim in federal district court or seek
administrative action.107
Administrative proceedings are conducted before an
Administrative Law Judge or the SEC.108 Where a successful
showing of securities violations is made by a preponderance of
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the evidence, the SEC may seek to enjoin wrongdoers from
continuing to engage in wrongful conduct,109 impose fines,110
and/or order disgorgement.111
The Role of the United States Attorney’s Office in
Securities-Based Crimes
As mentioned above, the SEC lacks the authority to impose
criminal sanctions on violators. Such proceedings must be
commenced by the United States Attorney’s Office within the
Department of Justice.112 The SEC rules enable the USAO to
access its investigation files, preventing bureaucratic
inefficiency from hampering an investigation.113
A securities-based criminal action has stronger
investigative techniques at its disposal, including the use of
search warrants,114 and the USAO’s ability to determine the
scope of discovery, without interference of the defendants.115
Although the USAO’s actions are generally initiated after a
referral from the SEC,116 the DOJ is not bound by, or reliant
solely upon, information from the SEC.117 Thus, the USAO
may commence criminal actions in situations where the SEC
has either declined to pursue civil or administrative remedies,
or where violations, while related to securities, are not within
the purview of the SEC’s enforcement efforts.118
The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force
On the heels of the cooperation between the SEC and the
DOJ in investigating Rajaratnam and numerous others
allegedly involved in his insider trading ring, the government
sent a strong message to would-be violators that joint
investigative and enforcement efforts were the new normal. By
Executive Order dated November 17, 2009, President Barack
Obama established the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
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Force (the “Task Force”).119 The Task Force, led by the
Department of Justice, includes senior-level members of
numerous federal agencies, and departments, including the
SEC, the Department of Treasury, the Criminal Investigation
Division of the IRS, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”).120
The Task Force’s main purpose is to advise the Attorney
General on investigating and prosecuting a variety of fraud
cases.121 Additionally, the Task Force is expected to
“coordinate law enforcement operations” with state and local
law enforcement.122 As SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro
explained, “Many financial frauds are complicated puzzles that
require painstaking efforts to piece together. By formally
coordinating our efforts, we will be able to better identify the
pieces, assemble the puzzle, and put an end to the fraud.”123
CONCLUSION
The accomplishments of the SEC and DOJ in unraveling
Raj Rajaratnam’s insider trading ring sounded a loud and clear
warning to white-collar criminals – federal agencies are now
working together, sharing their information, and using new
investigative methods to build and bolster their cases. While
some may characterize the use of recorded conversations in the
Rajaratnam cases as historically insignificant, it is clear that
neither the DOJ nor the SEC would have triumphed in the
actions commenced against Rajaratnam and others without
those communications. Given the number of defendants that
were fined and/or sentenced because of the admissible
wiretapped evidence, it is highly probable that enforcement
agencies will seek to intercept communications in future
investigations. If anything, the decisions in the Rajaratnam
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cases have refined the wiretapping standards propounded by
Title III.
The SEC’s and DOJ’s combined resources and pooled
efforts in the Rajaratnam cases are also significant. The
agencies’ coordination in these cases exemplified the aims of
the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force – to aggressively
and efficiently prosecute white-collar crime. The image
presented by the Task Force is that of a unified movement to
protect the public, and punish fraud. If this Task Force
succeeds, this is the dawn of a new era, one with strong
enforcement, and without red tape.
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